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STRIVING TO MAKE GREAT LAWYERS -
CITIZENSHIP AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY:
A JURISPRUDENCE FOR LAW TEACHINGt
MICHAEL I. SWYGERT *
I. INTRODUCTION
Over one-hundred years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes chal-
lenged a Harvard Law School gathering' by declaring that the
business of legal education is not merely to teach law, or to make
lawyers, it is "to teach law in the grand manner, and to make great
lawyers ."2 Whether or not Holmes' timeless exhortation may
be considered a moral precept for the law teaching community,' it
surely intimates that law teachers share pedagogic responsibilities
t Copyright © 1989 Michael 1. Swygert.
' Michael 1. Swygert is Professor of Law at Stetson University. Work on this thesis hegan
while Professor Swygert was a Visiting Member (tithe Faculty of Law at Cambridge University
during 1986-87, and continued while lie was it Visiting Professor at Emory University during
the fall semester. 1988.
The occasion was in connection with the 250th anniversary celebration of the founding
of Harvard University. SP e 2 WARREN, History of the Harvard Law School 439-40 (1908). Holmes
addressed a gathering sponsored by the recently formed Harvard Law School Association.
The principal orator for the celebration was James Russell Lowell. See SAMUEL WILE,ISTON,
LIFE AND LAW AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 82 (1940).
2 O.W. HOLMES. The Use of Law Schools, in Cou,vcren LEGAL. PAPERS 37,47-48 (1920).
3 Holmes felt that law and morality should be separated when discussing legal concepts.
Nonetheless, he acknowledged the pervasive force of morals, even in the development of
the positive law. See Holmes, 'IV Path of the Law, 10 Haut, . L. REV. 457,459-62 (1897). ''The
law is the witness'and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral
development. of the race." Id. at 459. "The practice of [morality) ... tends to make good
citizens ...." Id.
803
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that go beyond instilling doctrinal sophistication and nurturing law-
yering skills.4
. This article sets out one view of what these additional respon-
sibilities entail. This view suggests that, to teach law in the "grand
manner," law teachers should continually teach law, lawyering, and
citizenship, and also persistently consider claims of moral obligation
as well as the nexus between moral and legal obligations.'
The argument concludes that law teachers have normative respon-
sibilities in part because their power, positions, and promises en-
gender trust in their students. The trust takes the form of expec-
tations and reliance — expectations that law teachers know
best what issues ought to be raised to prepare students for law
practice, and reliance by students coming to law school and af-
fording teachers the opportunity to instruct them. Because ex-
pectations and reliance serve as cornerstones of moral responsi-
bility, law teachers share moral obligations in law teaching that
extend beyond teaching law.
In substance, this article describes a jurisprudence of law teach-
ing. It begins by comparing three related yet distinct teaching pe-
dagogies. Next, it analyzes the derivation of moral obligation. This
analysis is followed by a discussion of how moral and legal obliga-
tions relate. The discussion responds to the question of why the
moral pedagogy of law teaching requires law teachers to address
moral issues. This in turn is followed by a discussion of the diffi-
/laving been a full-dine law teacher for the past twenty years, I have become convinced
that collectively we fail its legal education to address sufficiently the important issues of moral
and ethical citizenship. We tend to be satisfied with teaching legal doctrine, rule manipulation,
and the techniques of lawyering. Simply having a required course in professional responsi-
bility and a jurisprudence elective seem to me to be insufficient to the challenge. On the
other hand, pervasive teaching of legal ethics is one positive development where that occurs.
Still, the concept of the pervasive teaclting of legal ethics may not be in harmony with the
realities at most law schools. For a description or the difficulties of a pervasive ethical or
moral pedagogy, sec infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. For an interesting analysis of
the normative dimensions of the law and their implications to law teaching, see Terrell,
Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental
Normative Principles, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 288 (1984).
Teaching the claims of morality is not the same thing as teaching virtue. Indeed,
educators have long been aware of the . problems of whether virtue can be taught at all. Cf.
Eisele, Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL. Enuc. 495 (1987) (Eisele sets out a normative
argument that virtue can and must be taught). For an amusing yet sobering portrayal of how
religious and ethical values are generally absent in the context of the modern American law
school, see Shaffer, Moral Implications and Effects of Legal Education: Or: Brother Justinian Goes
to Law School, 34 J. LEGAL Enuc. 190 (1984); see also Neuhaus, Law and the Rightness of Things-,
CIMISTIAN LEGAL Soc'y No. 3, 7 (1980),
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culties, real and apparent, of raising moral considerations in the
law school context. The article ends with an affirmation of the
benefits to society, to the student, and to the individual teacher of
bringing moral scrutiny into the law school classroom.
11. TEACHING LAW, LAWYERING, AND CITIZENSFII
A. The Doctrinal Pedagogy
The thesis of this discourse is that law teachers ought to teach
law, lawyering, and citizenship. By "teaching law" is meant primarily
an examination of the body of legal doctrine consisting largely of
prescriptive and proscriptive rules. Teaching law also includes anal-
yses of the policies underlying the doctrine, These changing doc-
trinal formulations primarily derive from court adjudications, leg-
islative enactments, and administrative agency activities.
Throughout this examination the law teacher and his or her stu-
dents jointly consider the origin, evolution, application, interpre-
tation, and manipulation of these evolved and evolving doctrinal
rules. The predominant pedagogic focus is on facilitating the stu-
dent's understanding of, and an adeptness in making arguments
about, how the doctrines apply in terms of a person's or other legal
entity's legal rights and obligations. This traditional and analytic
approach might be called the doctrinal teaching pedagogy." The doc-
trinal and analytic emphasis often includes a sprinkling of legal
history, jurisprudence, and comparative law, but generally only a
sprinkling.' To be sure, at certain law schools where law may be
taught more as a liberal arts curriculum than a vocational one,
perspective or normative courses and content will be emphasized
to a greater degree. Nonetheless, doctrinal coverage is still the
principal focus.
"As Luban has elaborated:
Doctrinal analysis assumes two main forms. First is the articulation of the
meaning of a line of cases: a theoretical description of the development of law
as it emerges. I call this 'rational reconstruction." Second is the analysis of law
in terms ()I' the rational considerations that inform it. 1 call this "policy analysis."
Luban, Against Autarky, 34 J. LEGAL Enuc. 1741, [77 (1984).
"An harvest look at the law school world today requires the confession that we rarely
Fulfill this larger [normative] obligation." C ralll Lim, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL
Enuc. 509, 511) (1987).
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B. The Practice Pedagogy
Teaching law also has come to include, especially in recent
years" and especially in America,'' a deliberate effort to create in
the law school environment opportunities for students to be intro-
duced to the skills of lawyering. This might be called "teaching
lawyering." The goal is to assist students in developing a minimal
proficiency in legal research and writing, appellate advocacy, legal
drafting, client counseling, conciliation, negotiation, fact marshall-
ing, and pretrial and trial practice. The pedagogic focus in lawyer
training is on the techniques of competent lawyering. Consequently,
skills training might be labeled the practice pedagogy.
Due in part to the high cost of effective skills training, law
schools still have a long way to go in developing skills programs
that benefit the entire student population. But there is more to the
slowness in the development of skills' programs than their cost. The
recognition and implementation of this practice pedagogy tends to
cause law school faculties to become de facto divided into two camps:
the substance (or academic) camp, and the skills (or lawyering)
camp. This division reflects a nearly two-century-old tension in
America between those that view teaching law as an academic mis-
sion and those that see it as primarily vocational training." ) Still, the
"The growth in the teaching of lawyering skills in American law schools has in part
resulted from the influence of the 1979 report of the American Bar Association Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, commonly referred to as the Crandon Report.
This report recommended that law schools provide instruction in the "fundamental skills of
lawyer competence." A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO BAR, TASK FORCE ON LAWYER
COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979).
9 1 n Britain the academic and skills training of lawyers, including solicitors and barristers,
are separated. The academic segment is normally taught as an undergraduate curriculum at
either university or polytechnic institutions. Very little in the way Of skills training other than
doctrinal analysis is addressed. More specialized lawyering skills are presented in either the
Inns of Court School of Law (the, barristers' prOfessional school), or at one of the Law
Society's various Colleges of Law (the solicitors' professional schools). Even so, the skills of
lawyering continue to be learned for the most part in England and Wales through appren-
ticeships, known as "pupillages" in the case of barristers and "articled clerks" in the case of
solicitors. See THE BAR ON TRIAL 68-82 (R. Hazel] ed. 1978); M. BERLINS & C. DYER, THE
LAW MACHINE 33-54 (2d ed. 1986).
'" "[T]he law school, as a professional school, performs the twin tasks of teaching sub-
stantive knowledge and also of training practitioners. As law professors, we have become
accustomed to ... academic tensions that these roles generate." Redlich, Law Schools as
Institutional Teachers of Professional Responsibility, 341 LEGAL Enuc. 215, 216 (1984); see also
R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's TO THE 1980's 5
(1983). From the time of Litchfield Law School in Connecticut, 'the dichotomy between the
teaching of law as a liberal and liberating study and the teaching of' law as a technical and
professional study was already established." STEVENS, supra, at 5.
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resulting divisiveness is unfortunate, as it taps energy more pro-
ductively expended in pursuing the shared educational objective of
striving to make "great lawyers." Moreover, the occasional sparring
between the academics and the skills segments of a law faculty
obscures the fact that the law faculty has a shared obligation to teach
both the skills as well as the substance of lawyering.
Why an obligation, one might ask. Because entering law stu-
dents, and the public they will soon serve, expect lawyers to have
acquired in their formal training both the knowledge and the skills
appropriate to lawyering."
C. The Moral Pedagogy
The public also expects that their lawyers "will go to town for
them" (to borrow a phrase often used by Professor Thomas L.
Shaffer), 12 and will do right by them. To do right means to act as a
responsible citizen, which in turn means to act not only competently,
but also to act morally — to do what is proper, not only what is legal.
To be sure, what is right is not always clear. But the question must
be raised in the law school classrOom because law teachers, as ex-
plained below, have a continuing obligation to address the morality
of good citizenship as well as the substance and skills of lawyering.
Fulfilling this obligation requires persistently raising claims regard-
ing what is right, what is proper, and what is ethical.'"
Teaching the morality of citizenship also involves the persistent
consideration of the normative bases for individual, corporate, and
governmental responsibilities. These responsibilities extend beyond
the mandates of the positive law. They can be framed best as claims
of moral obligation. Throughout this consideration, claims and lir-
" Although 1 ant unaware of etapirical evidence to substantiate these expectations, it is
difficult for me to believe that clients, when initially engaging lawyers, In nut expect them
to be both knowledgeable and skillful. Similarly, 1 strongly suspect that entering law students
expect to acquireethe requisite knowledge and skills appropriate for lawyering during their
law school tenure. cf Eron & Redmouni, The Effect of Legal Education on Altitudes, 41 j. LEGAL.
EDUC. 131 (1957).
12 See Shafrer, Preffite to M. SWYGERT & R. BATEY, MAXIMIZING TDE LAW S0I1001, EXPE-
RIENCE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS iii, v (1983) ( —Attorney' means Someone who goes to town
for you," quoting Miss Maude, speaking about her attorney, Atticus Finch. in To Km, A
MOCKINGBIRD).
"My defenSe for putting larger normative qUestions on our teaching agenda rests on
a notion that a university law school has a broader function than a cooking institute, a lntrber
college. or some other trade-oriented technical school." Cranium, supra note 7, at 510. judges
decide "who has not the responsibilities of, citizenship ...." R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1
(1086).
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guments about the requirements of citizenship are routinely raised
by the teacher and by his or her students. The pedagogic focus is
on notions of individual, institutional, corporate, and governmental
morality.
When considering the moral dimension of a problem, the in-
quiry should never end with the question of what the appropriate
legal doctrine does (or might) require. Rather, a 'further question
— what ought the person or corporation do, or have done, under
the circumstances — is always relevant." This morally-required
dimension to law teaching might be called the moral pedagogy. The
moral pedagogy foremost involves discussions centering around
claims of moral obligation. The sources of these moral obligations
arc next considered.
i I I. THE DERIVATION OF MORAL OBLIGATIONS
Notions of moral obligation are often attacked as involving
largely an individual's subjective opinions.'' But these arguments
are not well-founded. For one thing, beliefs as to specific moral
obligations are widely, although not universally, held. This shared
belief is evidenced by various legislative enactments prohibiting
discrimination on the bases of gender, race, age, and physical hand-
icap.' 6 Moreover, convincing arguments have been put forth that
14 "Today, even ardent defenders of positivism concede that it is a legitimate function
... of the law student and law professor ... to ask of a legal rule, once it is determined
analytically what it says and what it means, 'Is it just?" Berman, Toward an Integrative
Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 784 (1988). In teaching contracts,
1 often ask whether a litigated dispute could have been avoided if one or other of the
disputants had done what was morally right under the circumstances. For representative
cases that I discuss in my contracts course, see, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207
(1825), or Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959). See also Holcomb v. Zinke,
365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985) (Tillie ancient rule [caveat emptor) is no longer an expression
or American mores.").
Moral claims as they relate to the legal issues raised by abortion, privacy, preferential
hiring, self defense, and euthanasia. among others, are the focus of a provocative book by
Judith Jarvis Thomson titled RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY
(1986).
15 Ronald Dworkin has described a community's popular morality as its set of opinions
about justice and other political and personal virtues that are commonly held by most members
of the community or by a "moral elite" within it. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 97.
16 Under the common law, putative fathers were held only to have a "moral obligation"
to support their illegitimate children. Bastardy statutes providing for support payments upon
conviction represent one example of the codification of moral obligations. For a discussion
of the incorporation process, see Flew v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 123 A.2d 316 (1956); see also
Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985).
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normative principles are distinct from positive law and from an
individual's subjective opinions." These principles have force and
effect in society independent of positive law. Professor Ronald
Dworkin has argued that these' normative principles become the
bases for courts' resolutions of "hard" cases." In addition, these
principles, when particularized to concrete situations, become the
foundations for claims of specific moral obligations. Lawyers should
have ample opportunities to make these claims provided they have
become aware of their importance.
A normative morality of higher principles includes reasoned
beliefs held by most. law-trained persons relating to human dignity,
human aspiration, procedural fairness, due process, equal treat-
ment, fundamental human rights, and so on. These beliefs, it is
submitted, give rise to expectations that take the Form of norma-
tively-based moral obligation.
Normatively-based obligations arise primarily in response to
the community's expectations in reference to the positions we hold
(our positional or role responsibilities); the language we use, partic-
ularly the promise (our promissory responsibilities);" and the activ-
ities we engage in (our participatory responsibilities).'" And al-
though we may disagree over whether moral obligations derive
from community-based expectations, universal and immutable prin-
ciples, an unfolding of reason, utilitarian self-interest, or from di-
vine revelation, there can be little disagreement that at least the
perception of moral obligations clearly influences our private,
professional, and public lives. Presidential candidates, vice-presi-
dential candidates, lawyers, and yes, law teachers sooner or later
learn this truth.
My own view of the derivation of moral obligation relates in
part to a person's engendering, of trust and in part to religious
beliefs and an obligatory responsiveness to the miracle and gift of
17 See, e.g„ k. I)WORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26, 97-101 (1978).
is R. Dwo RION, supra no t e 13, at 87-89; see also Forer, A ulonomy and Responsibility: A Search
pr New Bases of Legal Rights and Responsibilities, 1986 UTA I I L. REv. 665, 686-88.
19 For one argument supporting the moral basis of promissory obligation, see C. FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A Timms. or' CONTRACT •islaGATioN 7-22, 40-43 (1981); see also
Swygert & Smucker, I'romissoty Estoppel in Florida: Growing Recognition of Promissory Obligation,
16 STETSON L. REV. I , 15-19 (1986); Locke, The Object Morality, and the Obligation to Keep a
Promise, 2 CAN. J. PHIL. 135 (1972).
2" "Mese activities include such daily routines as driving our cars, going shopping, and
socializing with friends anti neighbors.
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life. The response is my obligation to be caring toward my fellow
human beings. 21
 •
As to the engendering of trust, moral obligations derive from
normative expectations about personal, professional, and civic re-
sponsibilities that go beyond the mandates or legal duties imposed
by positive laws. These responsibilities become obligatory because
our positions, language, activities, and group memberships all cause
others to depend upon and to place trust in our positions, words,
and actions. 22
 Because dependencies and trust often reach a level
of community expectations, each of us in the web of society is relied
upon and trusted in countless, specific ways. This trust is a natural,
logical, and predictable response to our promises, positions, activi-
ties, and associations. The web of trust goes to the heart of our
socialization, the result of which is that. we are not autonomous
human beings, free to do whatever we desire. Rather, we are per-
sons morally responsible to all other persons in our community. We
live in a community of relationships with others. 23
 These relation-
ships result in reciprocal expectations.
Others may expect me to do or refrain from doing specific
things: to participate in games, activities, to go about my business
in predictable and definite ways; or, naturally to assume responsi-
bility for a particular state of affairs. 21
 In turn, I have expectations
of those around me. My expectations take the form of beliefs that
others with whom 1 interact will do right by me by fulfilling my
expectations of trust, a trust generated by their words, positions,
and associations.
As noted earlier, these normative expectations in turn serve as
bases for claims about moral obligations. These, claims may be gen-
eral and abstract, or specific and concrete. EXamples of general
claims include all promises, even gratuitous ones] ought to be kept; 25
law teachers ought to deal fairly with their stOdents; 26 employers
21 Mark 12:31: "'Thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself.'"
22 See Locke, supra note 19: MacCormick, Voluntary Obligations and Nonnative Powers, 46
ARISTOTELIAN Soc'v PROC. 50-59 (Supp. 1972).
23
 "[Al deeper understanding of one's individuality involves an affirmation of the relat-
edness between the sell' and the other person." Alexander, Beyond Positivism: A Theological
Perspective, 20 GA. L. HEv, 1089, 1130 (1986).
24 Certain obligations "involve not a duty to act, but instead a responsibility that a state
of affairs exists, or will exist." A.M. TEITENBORN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLI-
GATIONS 1 (1984),
" Locke, supra note 19, at 135-39; see also Swygert & Smucker, supra note 19, at 15-19.
26
 For a discussion on how to deal fairly with students in the areas of sexual relations,
use of student work in research, and in grading and reviewing examinations, see the timely
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ought to treat their employees with respect; 27 and, good sportsman-
ship ought to be observed while participating in or coaching
games."
These claims of general and abstract moral obligations should
not be ignored or slighted in teaching. This is so because they reflect
expectations that not only help shape our conduct, but also serve
as a predicate for tomorrow's positive laws. Indeed, a significant
segment of our positive law largely incorporates our society's nor-
mative expectations and beliefs. 2°
Nor should normative claims be ignored; it is from general
claims or statements about moral responsibilities that specific claims
are deduced or interpreted. The general claim, for example, that
law teachers ought to treat law students fairly is the basis for the
more specific claim that law teachers should use identical evaluative
criteria in grading a set of examinations — that it is right to evaluate
students on the same objective basis and wrong not to do so. 3° Being
treated the same in reference to objective grading criteria is a law
school, community-wide normative expectation, one that law stu-
dents expect law teachers to follow.
Consider for a moment important equal protection and due,
process decisions of American constitutional law. These cases not
only reflect the doctrine of precedent, or stare decisis, itself a nor-
mative principle, but they also and more significantly are the United
States Supreme Court's pronouncements of our nation's highest
moral aspirations. The Court's decisions often reflect previously
existing normative beliefs and claims of what the positive law ought
to be. 31 As these beliefs and claims change over time, so do the
Supreme Court's responses and interpretations. Thus, we have
article by Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions,
39 VAND. L. lbw. 275 (1986); see also L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 1-5 (1982).
27 In the marketplace, workers may value respect as much or more than compensation
levels. My fourteen years as a part-time mediator and arbitrator have made this clear to Inc.
" The fact that certain basketball coaches or tennis pros arc not universally admired
attests to the validity of this claim.
29 John Rawls in his highly influential discourse, A THEORY OF JusTicE (1971), sets out
a contractarian theory or law whereby the persons its the community consent. to the law
maker's pronouncements because the pronouncements reflect the community's shared prin-
ciples of justice. See also J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 11 (1980).
5° See O'Connell, The Wages of Virtue: Better Symbols for Law School Grades, 24 J. LEGAL.
Eouc. 362 (1972); see also Swygert, Putting Law School Grades in Perspective, 12 STETsoN L.
REV. 701 (1983).
For a description of the United States Supreme Court's normative interpretation of
the Constitution, see R. DWORION, supra. note 13, at 355-99.
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Plessy v. Ferguson, 32 a half-century or so after it was decided, becom-
ing Brown v. Board of Education. 33
It is essential to recognize, moreover, that both the general and
the particularized claims and expectations about what the law ought
to be exist in lawyers' minds prior to a court's (including the Su-
preme Court's) pronouncements. 34 Consequently, tomorrow's judi-
cial rulings may be anticipated by identifying and focusing upon
society's, especially the legal profession's, normative beliefs. Future
interpretations of existing laws will to a significant degree reflect
the community's — certainly the lawyering community's — evolving
expectations of the normative responsibilities pertaining to its in-
dividuals and to its business and governmental institutions.
If only to shed light on the legal process perspectives of how
new legal requirements come into being and why interpretations of
existing rules change over time, law teachers should persistently
consider claims of normative obligations. But other arguments sup-
port the proposition that law teachers ought to routinely consider
claims of' moral obligations. One argument concerns the nexus be-
tween moral and legal obligations.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Philosophical explanations of morality, as well as speculations
about law, posit the central notion of obligation. 33 In a reductionist
sense, an obligation may be said to be any source of compulsion
that, when disregarded, causes the disobeying party to be put at
risk of losing something that society (not necessarily the party at
risk) prefers or values. In this sense, obligations may be thought of
as externally compelled. They are imposed upon individuals with-
out regard to their Consent.
In our Judeo-Christian society, normative preferences typically
include the perceived values of freedom, trust, wealth, love, friend-
32
 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33
 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II),
" The now somewhat quaint expression, "Brandeis brief," which brings to the Court's
attention social data as relevant factors to be taken into consideration in its decision making,
underscores this point. Moreover, judges as well as legislators "usually make laws which they
believe to be morally right ...." P.S. ATIYAH, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 76 (1983).
35 See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 12-17 (1965). See also J. HARRIS,
supra note 29, at 83-85. To achieve results, law "must persuade or compel people to behave
in the desired fashion.... fClompulsion is the more important of these two," P.S. ATIYAH,
Supra note 34, at 53.
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ship, divine approval, integrity, power, rectitude, and respect. 3"
Given these preferences or values, it becomes apparent how moral
and legal obligations are related because each represents a societal
compulsion one disobeys at one's peril. To act at peril is to risk
losing a preferred value. Consequently, moral as well as legal obli-
gations shape conduct. Thus, from a behavioralist perspective, pos-
itive law and notions of morality are not separate spheres, but are
intertwined. •
Limiting our discussion of obligation to legal duties (as many
theorists and law teachers do) causes us to emphasize in our teaching
the remedial or "rights" side of the law and morality milieu. In
turn, lawyers may tend to emphasize their clients' legal rights while
neglecting a mutual exploration of their own and their clients' moral
responsibilities. This pedagogical imbalance in teaching, which may
be later reflected in lawycring, contributes to the notion that a legal
cure must: exist for every illness, frustration, disgrace, and disap-
pointment. This is a corrupting notion because it teaches the fake-
hood that we do not have responsibility for our own well-being, let
alone our neighbor- 's. 37
The linkage between moral and legal obligations becomes evi-
dent when considering the good citizenship responsibilities of law-
yers as well as those of law teachers. As suggested above, to be a
responsible citizen, one must acknowledge and respond to both
moral and legal obligations. This is so because the community ex-
pects and trusts that each of us as a citizen of the community will
try to fulfill both kinds of obligations. When we do so, we do right
by our community. We fulfill its trusts and legitimate expectations
not only in reference to our membership in the community, but
also and more importantly in reference to our position or role
within the community.
The community's trust and expectations are especially acute
when it comes to the roles lawyers play." In times of trouble, clients
come to lawyers for help in response to the special powers, skills,
5" See, e.g., the list of eight values consisting of power, respect, enlightenment, wealth,
well-being, rectitude, skill, and affection, set out by Lasswell and McDougal in Legal Education
and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
Swygert, The Moral Basis of Obligation: A Critique of"Obligation-Duty" Contemporary Anal-
yses, 16 STETSON. L. Rev. 557, 500-61 (1987); see also R, NOZICR, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
(1982) (especially Chapter Three, "Moral Constraints and the State"). Instead of incorporat-
ing rights into the end state to he achieved, one Wright place them as side constraints upon
the actions to be done. R. NozicK, supra, at 29.
j 8 "Lillie public needs lawyers who acclaim the hope and expectation that [their] rights
will be enforced." Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEcAt, Elmo. 222, 228 (1984).
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and influence lawyers are presumed to have. Clients expect (or
ought to expect) their lawyers to do right by them by giving them
the best advice, legal skills, and moral counsel the lawyers are ca-
pable of giving. To give moral counsel does not mean preaching
morality. Rather, it involves raising and discussing with the client
moral issues and the moral ramifications of alternatives. This moral
dialogue, according to Shaffer, is the essence of the law office con-
versation.'"
And even if clients do not expect moral guidance, they still get
it from their attorneys in positive or negative fashion. For the
influence of lawyers extends to their serving as good or bad role
models of citizen responsibility. Thus, if clients are to understand
fully and respond to their legal and moral obligations, lawyers must
give good moral counsel and set good examples in their lawyering
and in interactions with clients and other persons and institutions.
Likewise, teachers, all teachers, set examples for their students,
tomorrow's citizens: Law teachers in their roles as legal educators
have special responsibilities to their law students. 4° Because law
teachers, like lawyers, occupy positions of power and influence,"
they serve as role models to their students of what it means to be
good lawyers and good citizens. Because law teachers control the
agenda of what is perceived that law students need to know (a moral
determination), law teachers, like lawyers, are specially trusted,
trusted to do right by their students in deciding what ought to be
covered both in the curriculum and in the classroom. In short,
whether or not we stop to think about it, what law teachers choose
to teach, how we teach, and how we choose to act toward our
students are moral decisions having far reaching ramifications. The
fact is that law teachers are enormously trusted to make the right
decisions. And that, of course, raises some nagging and potentially
troublesome questions, questions about what law teachers are doing
and not doing.
Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231,232 (1979).
"The beginning and end of a lawyer's professional life is talking with a client about what is
to be done.... [T]his is a moral conversation." Id. at 231; see also G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OP LAW 1-14 (1978). It should not be forgotten that "many laws are designed to
serve ethical purposes." 1'.S. ATIS'AEI, supra Dote 34, at 76.
""American law faculties are to the American legal profession what the Old Testament
prophets were to Israel." T.-SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 177 (1981).
4 ' "Law teachers have the power to influence the process by which law students can
numb themselves to many of their more desirable human impulses." Carrington, supra note
38, at 224.
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For one, are we, the nation's nearly five thousand law teachers,
even cognizant of (let alone fulfilling) the enormous trust conferred
upon us? Are we meeting our moral obligations to our students
who depend on us and to the public who will in turn depend upon
them?
To do right, to fulfill our trust, we must teach not only sub-
stantive doctrinal analysis and rudimentary lawyering skills, but we
must also address a lawyer's obligation to be a good citizen. 42 We
can do this in part by persistently raising claims and arguments
concerning a lawyer's moral as well as legal obligations. We can also
do it by being cognizant of and responsive to our own moral obli-
gations.
To respond to our own moral obligations as law teachers means
that we must routinely reexamine matters we take for granted, such
as the curriculum and the case books we use. To do right means
that we must care, sincerely care,43 about our students' education
and preparedness to serve the public competently and morally. We
are, as Professor David Vernon has reported it, the "intellectual
and moral gate keepers" of the legal profession."
To do right does not require that law teachers teach morality,
but it minimally demands that we morally teach. While teaching
morality suggests taking a stand for particular claim of morality, to
teach morally requires taking a stand for morality by acknowledging
and responding to our own and to others' normative responsibilities.
Moreover, as role models of citizen responsibility for our stu-
dents, we are morally obligated to live our lives as morally sensitive
and responsive individuals, professionals, and legal educators.
Moral teaching cannot be separated from moral living. We cannot
extol virtue in our professional roles and tolerate immorality in our
private affairs. Our acknowledgment, response, and example-set-
ting, I submit, are all required in striving to teach law in the grand
manner. In our striving to do right by our students, we will be
responding to our own profession's moral obligation to assist law
students in their striving to become great lawyers for the benefit of
their clients, the courts, the legal profession, and society.
. 12 "Is there not also a commitment, both for the law teacher and student, to search for
the good?" Cranium, supra note 7, at 511.
41 See Sandaiow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL. Enuc, 163 (1984).
"Students ought not to be regarded merely as instruments, ... not even in the setting of a
professional school. They are sources of value in their own right." Id. at 167.
" Vernon, Ethics in Academe — Afton Dekanal, 34 J. LEGAL, Enuc. 205, 211 (1984),
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V. THE CHALLENGE OF TEACHING BOTH LAW AND CITIZENSHIP
Given the above argument that law teaching ought to include
the persistent consideration of claims about moral obligation and
citizen responsibility, it is appropriate to raise the question of
whether law teachers are, by and large, doing so. Although the
evidence is not easily discernible, and even though claims of mo-
rality are undoubtedly being raised by law teachers, a few clues
intimate that moral discussions are not being persistently empha-
sized either in our law school classrooms or in our teaching mate-
rials.45
For one thing, it may be easy, too easy, to restrict one's teaching
and writing about law to a positivist view of obligation.46 Certainly,
the announced doctrinal rules are easier to set out and discuss than
are the more confusing, speculative, and at times opposing claims
in reference to moral obligations. 47 (Bar examiners do not ask what
the law ought to be. Nor do most law school examinations.) Analytic
jurisprudence, or asking what the law "is" and stressing reasoning
by precedent — or economic analysis, asking, for example, econom-
ically how to best lower the cost of accidents — seem far safer and
easier to deal with than discussing the amorphous world of
"oughts." Legal and economic "rules" tend to be "hard." Moral
"oughts" tend at times to be "soft." 48 While rules can be coached,
" "[Mlost casebooks and courses, in design and effect, are doctrinally rather than nor-
matively driven." Wasserstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer, 341 LEGAL EUUC. 155,
159 (1984). Indeed, the absence of any pervasive coverage of morality as related to law is
gleaned from perusing published works for law students authored by both American and
British law teachers. These casebooks, texts, and legal guides for the most part reveal few
references to notions or theories of normative responsibility or moral obligation. There are
exceptions, of course, including the extensive writings of American law professor Thomas
L. Shaffer. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER, supra note 40; T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT,
READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS (1985); Shaffer, supra note 39, at 231; Shaffer, The Legal
Ethics of the Two Kingdoms, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 3 (1983).
46 
"The prevailing model of law study and law teaching in the United States probably is
one of legal positivism (law treated as a system of rules) ...." Van Doren, Implications of
Jurisprudence to Law Teaching and Student Learning, in SwycEuT HAITI', supra note 12, at 55.
47 "Many teachers find it difficult or inappropriate to raise the fundamental questions in
class or in their writing. It is difficult, because they are often hard and controversial ques-
tions." Cramton, supra note 7, at 512 (citing Shaffer, Moral Theology in Legal Ethics, 12 CAPITAL
U. L. REV. 179, 184-90 (1982)). "[There are] very real difficulties of discussing fundamental
moral issues in the law school classroom ... " Id. at 512 n. 1 1; see also Bartlett, Teaching Values:
A Dilemma, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519 (1987) ("The dilemma is that we cannot be value-neutral
in our teaching but neither can we teach values . . ..").
48 Student concerns about justice or fairness are often dismissed in the classroom as
founded on "mushy and naive appeals to sentiments, sympathies, or [moral] commitments
that [are thought to] have no place in the harder ... life and mind of the lawyer." Wasser-
Strom, supra note 45, at 159.
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oughts tend to be slippery. And law teachers do not like to fumble
the ba11,4 °
But to shirk our moral responsibilities is dangerous pedagogy.
For if we escape or deny responsibility for what is right, best, or
good for society in this fashion, in time so will our students likely
emulate our isolationism in their roles as lawyers..
Another challenge to teaching a moral pedagogy is the current
popularity of the law and economics emphasis, on the one hand,5°
and the critical legal studies perspective, on the other.'' The prob-
lem is that both of these perspectives, for different reasons, mini-
mize the relevanCy of moral obligation and, as a result, do not place
moral claims high on their respective agendas. Morality, normative
principles, natural law, even social utilitarianism seem to have been
pushed aside by many modern legal theorists and academicians in
favor of largely economic or political explanations of human con-
duct and aspiration.
Now these newer perspectives are not necessarily negative de-
velopments. These largely American views have widened the intel-
lectual parameters of legal education and have given teachers and
students deeper insights into our legal system and its functioning.
The problem is that each view attempts to explain too much, and
thereby minimizes the role of moral obligations and the nexus
between law and -morality. Law involves far more than wealth max-
imization and political manipulations.
Another difficulty of teaching a moral pedagogy is the typical,
doctrinally-weighted law school curriculum. The curriculum con-
tains few normative offerings. Many law teachers apparently believe
that discussions of moral obligation can be either omitted or left to
elective jurisprudence courses and seminars. This approach, how-
ever, as others have said, amounts to too little, too late, for too few. 52
" "Pine of the characteristics of the role or the professor is that it provides a position
from which one can be aggressive.... [T]he professor may carry on an essentially one-sided
battle.... 1 believe this to be highly important. as a motivating factor to those who become
law professors." Watson, The Quest For Professional Competence; Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv, 91, 114 (1968).
" See generally K. POSNER, TOE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW I (1972) (economic reasoning
is based on the assumption that "mall is a rational maximizer ... of his self interest"); see also
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability,
2 J. LEGAL Sruo. 151 (1973).
51 See Tushrict, Following the' Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 IIARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). For a bibliography of literature of the critical legal
studies movement, see Kennedy & Klaretn, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE
L.J. 461 (1984),
52 Wasserstrom, supra note 45, at 159.
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Given these and other impediments to raising routinely law and
morality claims in the law school context, I am left after two decades
of teaching law with the uneasy feeling that many law teachers,
perhaps by accident more than through intellectual scrutiny, come
to believe that legal and moral obligations are distinct worlds and
that the claimS of morality are best kept outside the law school
classroom. But this moral isolationism 53 ignores the intertwining of
moral and legal obligations, which together establish the responsi-
bilities of citizenship.
As this article has pointed out, moral as well as legal obligations
extend to law teachers' professional responsibilities. In response to
these obligations, we law teachers have a responsibility to examine
routinely the claims of moral obligations in our classrooms, in our
writings, and in our roles as citizens and as legal educators. The
public's and our students' trust require it.
VI. BENEFITS OF THE MORAL PEDAGOGY
Students exposed to the moral pedagogy in their law school
experience will benefit. Most importantly, they will be able to hold
on to the normative beliefs that they typically bring to law school.
These normative beliefs may include the notion that law is related
to, and a means to attain, justice. One who is concerned about justice
is concerned about "right" outcomes. In addition, students will see
how legal rules often incorporate principles of morality. Indeed,
students' normative beliefs in justice, fairness, honesty, and human
dignity will not be discarded, but rather will become more fully
developed as a result of persistent exposure to discussions centering
on normative obligations and responsibilities. Students will perceive
how legal and moral obligations are intertwined when it comes to
defining one's responsibilities.
Consider a parent's responsibilities to his or her child, respon-
sibilities that include the legal obligations of furnishing care and
support." Various general and abstract normative claims about pa-
rental obligations are routinely made in and out of legal contexts.
The legal criteria espoused by courts involving decisions mandating
" Shaffer, supra note 39, at 239-40.
" Professor Frank Alexander has noted that insights of religious traditions central to
our Judaic-Christian heritage can "provide significant perspectives" on ,legal relationships
including those of the family. Alexander, supra note 23, at 1126. The covenant tradition of
authority between God and people can be focused on family members, the tradition
"standlingi a' a call for the greatest degree of .. , responsibility." Id. at 1128, 1131.
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consideration of the best interests of a child are predicated upon
notions of moral obligations involving trust, love, and care. At what
point do the legal obligations end and the moral responsibilities
continue? Can they be separated at all? Family law teachers have to
deal constantly with the overlays of legal and moral obligation. The
intertwining of law and morality pervades many other segments of
the law school curriculum as well — labor, torts, constitutional law,
contracts, and so on. Do we as law teachers sufficiently recognize
and respond to this social fact? If we do, our students surely ben-
efit.' 5 If we do, those of us who teach will reap personal benefits as
well.
In emphasizing normative obligations, the law teacher may
come away from his or her teaching and scholarship with a generally
positive attitude regarding the potential for people, law, and insti-
tutions to operate in mutual harmony. The uplifting aspect of ac-
knowledging that citizens have moral obligations concerning their
harmonious well-being and that moral obligations are coterminous
only to a point with their legal duties is the resulting affirmation of
the existence and importance of human dignity, altruism, love, care;
and charity. These acknowledgments also remind us that a society's
positive laws can never serve as the all-purpose glue to keep society
together. hi addition, acknowledging moral obligations in teaching
may also reflect a teacher's personal religious beliefs. This can be a
personally harmonious, even a joyous, experience as the exercise of
religious beliefs through one's thoughts and behavior need not be
taboo in the law school classroom. 5 (3
Law teachers focusing on claims of moral obligation as an in-
gredient of teaching in the grand manner may or may not perceive
law as essentially a tool of class oppression exercised by a nefarious
power elite to protect their power, position, and wealth. Although
admitting of social and economic injustices, one holding a view of
law teaching and law study as including consideration of moral
obligations probably will not dwell on the paradox of the claims of
law vis-a-vis the realities to the point of personal or professional
"I f we can eitgage one another on the level of our convictions, . • our views of law
will be enriched." Id. at 1134.
"Virtually all of the conceptual pillars of liberal democracy — impartial adjudication,
judicial review, ... the presumption of innocence, habeas corpus, equal protection of the
laws, good faith — have an origin or justification in the ,Judeo-Christian tradition ...."
Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in
Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. It EV. 1579, 1618-19 (1987).
820	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:803
cynicism. A moral perspective looks with hope to the future without
being overly judgmental about the past.
Nor does a moral view of obligation isolate one value — max-
imization of wealth — as underpinning or explaining the entire
legal and social system. To the contrary, a view of moral obligation
relating to citizen responsibility acknowledges many invisible hands
at work in addition to those of Adam Smith's and the proletariat's.
The hands at work within society include those normative, moral,
and religious forces taking the form of expectations, trusts, and
religious beliefs. These beliefs and trusts, along with resulting reli-
ances and expectations, over time help shape a society's normative
ethos — an ethos that relates to such values as human life, aspira-
tion, and dignity, and incorporates principles of freedom, justice,
and procedural fairness. 57
VII. CONCLUSION
A law teacher's persistent consideration of normative principles
along with more particularized claims of moral obligations is itself'
a morally obligatory responsibility. It is a necessary ingredient in
striving to teach law "in the grand manner" in an effort to "make
great lawyers."58 A moral pedagogy that explores the responsibilities
of citizenship and the moral obligations of the community's mem-
bers is, in the end, the appropriate jurisprudence for law teaching.
57 R. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 404. "Citizens ... aim to be governed justly and fairly
and whit due process ...." Id. at 406.
58 See Linowitz, Point of View: Law Schools Must Help Make the Practice of Law the Learned
and Humane Profession It Once Was, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER Enucivrior4 A52 (Sept. 14,
1988) ("The test of a system of justice is whether it serves people whose need is great — by
their measurement, not ours ....").
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